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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO SET ASIDE THE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF 
THE DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AS 
GUARANTEED BY BOTH THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I of the Utah Constitution impose procedural due 
process restrictions on government's power to proceed against 
individuals and their property. Implicit in the concept of 
procedural due process are the guarantees that the forum will be 
fair and reasonable and that the defendant will have an 
opportunity to appear and defend against the action. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognizes that Federal due process 
requirements assure, to the extent possible, that the defendant 
will have an opportunity to be put on notice of pending legal 
action and to have the opportunity to present defenses. Carlson 
v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Utah 1987). 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides a 
mechanism whereby due process guarantees are implemented. 
Service of process implements the procedural 
due process requirement that a defendant be 
informed of pending legal action and be 
provided with an opportunity to defend 
against the action. 
Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d at 1271. 
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Defendant asserts that the plaintiffs1 failure to comply 
with Rule 4 has violated the defendant's procedural due process 
guarantees of both the United states Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution, Additionally, as a result of the failure to comply 
with Rule 4, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a 
default against the defendant. 
The defendant recognizes that while personal service of 
process guarantees that the defendant will be notified of pending 
legal action, the United States Supreme Court as well as the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that actual notice is not always 
necessary. Thus, procedures to effect service other than by 
personal service have been adopted such as that found in Rule 
4(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides: 
If the person to be served refuses to accept 
a copy of the process, service shall be 
sufficient if the person serving the same 
shall state the name of the process and offer 
to deliver a copy thereof. 
Defendant asserts however that the trial court incorrectly 
concluded that the defendant Pizzello refused to accept a copy of 
the process. In order for Rule 4(i) to be harmonious with the 
procedural due process guarantees, the Rule must be utilized when 
it is reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
appraise the interested party of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to participate in the action. Mullane 
2 
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 
652, 657 (1950). 
Defendant asserts that he should have been appraised of the 
action and given an opportunity to defend the action. Defendant 
did not refuse to accept service and the trial court improperly 
concluded that service was refused. At worst, defendant refused 
to answer his door. 
The trial court assumedly relied upon the Utah Court of 
Appeals decision of Wood v. Weening, 736 P.2d 1053 (Utah App. 
1987), to assist it in concluding that service had been obtained 
under Rule 4(i) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Wood v. 
Weening decision is distinguishable from the present facts and 
defendant refers the court to the defendant's original brief for 
further discussion of the Wood decision. 
Although the defendant had been unable to cite authority for 
the proposition that silence or inactivity may not constitute a 
refusal, a Federal Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision held 
that a process server must bring the question of due process 
within the purview of the person to be served. 
In the Federal Second Circuit Court of Appeals case of Davis 
v. Museler, 713 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1983), defendants moved to 
vacate a default judgment based upon, among other reasons, 
defective service. In Davis, the plaintiff engaged the services 
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of a private investigator to locate the defendants Museler and 
Maloney. According to the investigator1s affidavit of service, 
the investigator arrived at the Museler/Maloney residence and was 
greeted at the front door by a woman who roughly fit Maloney1s 
description. However, the woman denied ever having heard of 
Jacqueline Museler. After briefly consulting with the man who 
was working on the front lawn and who confirmed that "this is the 
Museler residence", the investigator returned and knocked again. 
This time he was met by a man who claimed to be "Joe Marshall" 
but who produced a business card bearing the name of "C. 
Bellammy". Having seen enough, the investigator asserted that 
the man at the door was Joseph H. Museler and advised that he had 
subpoena and deposition notices as well as summons and complaints 
for him and Jacqueline Maloney. When the man refused to accept 
service, the investigator informed him that he was leaving the 
papers on the railing at the front door. 
On appeal, the defendants raised the issue that the lower 
court's denial of a motion to vacate the default judgment was in 
error based upon improper service obtained by the plaintiff. The 
defendants submitted affidavits at the lower court indicating 
that they were not at home on the day of the alleged service. In 
considering the defendants1 motion to set aside the default based 
upon improper service, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted: 
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With respect to personal service, however, we 
believe the defendants1 motion raised 
sufficiently serious questions of fact to 
warrant an evidentiary hearing under New York 
law . . . We recognize that New York have 
traditionally and wisely had little tolerance 
for the type of gamesmanship that plaintiffs 
claim took place here. It is thus well 
settled under New York law that where a 
defendant refuses to accept service, the 
papers may be left in his general vicinity. 
[Citations omitted.] But a process server 
who adopts this course of action must bring 
"the questioned due process within the 
purview of the person to be served" 
[citations omitted], since "the defendant 
must be made aware that he or she is in fact 
being served with process." Thus, even if we 
were to accept that the Vassalotti 
[investigator] affidavit at face value, we 
could not necessarily conclude that Maloney 
had been properly served. [Citations 
omitted.] For these reasons, a hearing must 
be held before it can be determined whether 
the motion to vacate should be granted on the 
grounds of defective service." 
Id. at 914. 
Recognizing that the preceding case relies upon New York 
law, it is significant to note that the court held that the 
defendants must be made aware they are in fact being served with 
process. There has not been a decision before the Utah Supreme 
Court or the Utah Court of Appeals wherein the court has upheld 
service where the process server simply stated the name of the 
process and offered to deliver a copy thereof without 
encountering some individual who could at least put the person to 
be served on notice. 
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Defendant asserts that without some further evidence that 
there was a refusal by the defendant to accept service, the trial 
court abused its discretion in concluding that there was a 
refusal and that service was appropriate. Defendant was denied 
due process as guaranteed by both the United States Constitution 
and the Utah Constitution. 
POINT II 
DUE PROCESS IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT AND 
VIOLATION CAN BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT ON 
APPEAL. 
Defendant recognizes the general rule outlined in the brief 
of plaintiff that issues raised for the first time on appeal 
which were not raised before the trial court will not be 
considered on appeal. Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (Utah 1979), 
Brief of Appellant, Page 14. However, the Utah Supreme Court has 
held that where fundamental rights and jurisdictional issues are 
raised, even for the first time on appeal, the same will be heard 
by the Court. 
As to the first argument, plaintiff contends 
that the Act violates Article VI, Section 28 
of the Utah Constitution. Issues not raised 
at trial cannot be raised on appeal. This 
general rule applies equally to 
constitutional issues, with the limited 
exception of where a person's liberty is at 
stake. 
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Pratt v. City Council City of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172, 174 (Utah 
1981); see also, In re Woodward, 14 Utah 2d 336, 384 P.2d 110 
(1963). 
The constitutional arguments raised by defendant Pizzello 
clearly affects the defendant's liberty and due process and 
therefore is appropriate for review by this Court. 
POINT III 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT PROMULGATED A RULE 
REQUIRING SHOWING OF MERITORIOUS DEFENSE PRIOR 
TO RELIEF FROM DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS A VIOLATION 
OF DUE PROCESS BOTH UNDER THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Plaintiffs attempt to minimize the defendant's argument that 
the Utah Supreme Court's requirement of showing a meritorious 
defense as set forth in the opinion of State By and Through the 
Department of Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 
1983), constitutes an unconstitutional denial of due process by 
distinguishing the facts of the United states Supreme Court 
decision in Paralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 108 s. Ct. 
896, 99 L. Ed. 2d 75 (1988). Plaintiffs argue that the critical 
facts in Paralta are not present in the instant case. Plaintiffs 
emphasize that the Court's holding in Paralta arose from the fact 
that Paralta had never been properly served and therefore had 
never had proper notice. 
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However, defendant's argument in the present case that the 
requirements of Musselman violate both Federal and State 
constitutional due process guarantees are based upon the Utah 
Federal District Court decision of Gary Fassio v. The Honorable 
Maurice Jones and Collection Management Agency, Inc., No. 88-C-
965G (D. Utah 1989), in which there was proper service upon the 
defendant Gary Fassio in the underlying collection action. (See 
Addendum C, Brief of Appellant, Memorandum Decision and Order in 
Fassio v. Jones, et al.). 
In Fassio, the court in its memorandum decision summarized 
the facts of the underlying action in the Third Circuit Court of 
Salt Lake County. As noted in the memorandum decision, Fassio 
was properly served with the summons and complaint but believed 
that the matter had previously been resolved and therefore failed 
to file an answer. With proper service upon Fassio, the 
Honorable Judge J. Thomas Greene concluded that promulgated 
procedural rule of court imposed by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Musselman imposing the showing of a meritorious defense, in 
addition to the other requirements of Rules 55 and 60 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure before a default judgment can be 
vacated, was declared unconstitutional as a violation of the due 
process clause of the United States Constitution. 
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Defendant recognizes that the record is void as to what was 
the basis for Judge Daniels denial of defendant's motion to set 
aside the default judgment. However, inasmuch as the Musselman 
decision was the most current guidance offered by the Utah 
Supreme Court for a lower court in determining whether or not a 
motion to set aside a default should be granted, it must be 
assumed that Judge Daniels relied upon the Musselman decision in 
denying defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment in 
the present action. 
It would appear clear from the Fassio decision, which the 
defendant recognizes as not binding upon this Court, that the 
promulgated rule offered in Musselman is a violation of due 
process of law if the showing of a meritorious defense is imposed 
in addition to the procedural requirements which would otherwise 
justify setting aside the default judgment. 
The defendant in the instant action was denied due process 
of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, 
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the default judgment 
should be set aside based on the deprivation of said rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in refusing to set aside the default 
judgment entered against defendant Pizzello. The trial court 
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abused its discretion in concluding that the defendant was served 
pursuant to Rule 4(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The trial court's error constituted a violation of the 
defendant's due process guarantees of both the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Utah Constitution. 
Additional due process guarantees were violated by the 
procedural rule promulgated by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
Musselman decision, requiring a showing of a meritorious defense 
prior to granting relief from default judgment. 
Based upon the foregoing, defendant respectfully request 
that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of the motion to 
set aside default judgment. 
7<t^ DATED this /? j day of November, 1989. 
STRONG & HANNI 
By 
Joseph 0j Joyce 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant 
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